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Csaba Varga, Budapest / Hungary 
 
The Philosophy of European Law 
with »Order Out of Chaos« Set-up and Functioning 
 
Abstract: In reconsideration of the composition and operation of European law, it is the description of 
its underlying mentality that may cast best light on the query whether European law is the extension of 
domestic laws or a sui generis product. As to its action, European law is destructive upon the survival 
of traditions of legal positivism, for it recalls post modern clichés rather. Like a solar system with 
planets, it is two-centred from the beginning, commissioning both implementation and judicial check 
to member states. As part of global post modernism, a) European law stems from artificial reality 
construction freed from particular historical experience and, indeed, anything given hic et nunc. By its 
operation, b) it dynamises large structures and sets in motion that what is chaos itself. It is owing to 
reconstructive human intent solely that any outcome can at all be seen as fitting to some ideal of 
order, albeit neither operation nor daily management strives for implementing any systemicity. This is 
the way in which the European law becomes adequate reflection of the underlying (macro) economic 
basis,  which it  is  to  serve  as  superstructure.  Accordingly, c)  the  entire construct  is  operated  (as 
integrated into one well-working unit) within the framework of an artificially animated dynamism. 
With  its  “order  out  of  chaos”  philosophy  it  assures  member  states’  standing  involvement  and 
competition, achieving a flexibly self-adapting (and unprecedentedly high degree of) conformity. 
Keywords: European law, national laws; legal culture; construction, functioning; codification, code 
substitutes; autopoiesis, self-closure; justification, substantiation; order out of chaos 
 
I. Self-positioning within European and Global Perspectives 
As far as challenges are concerned to find what place may Hungary occupy with her law and 
legal culture in the European Union after her accession to membership is concluded, first of 
all it seems to be suitable to trying to foresee the future in mirror of the development from 
recent past to the present, through a comparative historical analysis. 
In accordance with this, the first item to examine is the foundational issue of the ways in 
which  the  European  Union’s  common  law  issued  uniformly  to  all  its  members,  its 
administrative implementation  under the promise of some well-balanced and co-ordinated 
uniformity, as well as its judicial application by its central law-adjudication agencies will be 
in the position to exert a decisive impact on either the long-term survival or the gradual 
withering away of the historical specificities and relative independence of the national legal 
systems involved. Or, as seen from the opposite side, the dilemma of partner states is in what 2 
exactly and to what extent this law of the European Union may become a genuinely and truly 
sui generis formation indeed. Otherwise formulated, how much its creation, administrative 
implementation and judicial ascertainment with feasible adaptation are to become captive of 
the  giant  partners  fighting  with  one  another  within  the  Union  to  extend  their  respective 
(national) influence to the rest, in order that the English, German and/or French domestic 
traditions can eventually be transformed into one single all-European scheme. All this covers 
the prospects of standing divergence versus final convergence of the (continental) Civil Law 
and the (Anglo-Saxon) Common Law mentalities; the selection of the models for, as well as 
the  techniques  and  future  chances  of,  the  common  codification  of  European  (private 
substantive and procedural, and further on) laws; the definition of the pattern(s) followed in 
law-adjudication exercised by the common judicial fora of Europe; and, altogether and taken 
as  a  basis,  the  mapping  out  of  both  the  legal  traditions  of  the  participating  states  by 
delineating their historical  groups  and sub-groups  (with past  and present  co-relations  and 
changes  of  shift  thereof)  and  of  their  chances  of  either  ultimate  preservation  or  perhaps 
sublation—in the process of and despite their continual self-adapting transformation, in the 
first place as to their respective sources of the law, their conceptuality, structure and problem 
sensitivity, as well as the techniques and judicial reasoning they use, including its canonised 
skills as well. 
Such dealing with the above, if exhausted by filling up similar frames exclusively, would 
appear as suggesting some self-offer for servile copying, albeit the way open for all new-
comers is by far not of one-sense in principle. For as members of equal standing by now, we 
cannot take as simply given from the beginning that, just as a token and independently of us 
as actors (destined merely to watch the scene from a distance), in the Union’s womb and 
through its complex chain-movement, law is getting continuously formed addressing us, too; 
while it is not to be taken as a self-propelling cause either that from all this some definite 
modification and continued change of respective domestic laws will ensue as the former’s 
simple extension or mechanical conclusion, as in some reflex automatism. Or, just two-sensed 
and therefore also mutual and multi-actored this path is. Accordingly, the opposite pole of 
why to investigate effects will exactly be the issue, whether or not there are skills and chances 
hidden  in  our  traditions,  institutionalisations,  particular  solutions,  experiences,  or  even 
practices of pressurisation, through the coming activation of which we can also assert our own 
interests  within—and  by  contributing  to—the  European  Union’s  common  thought  and 
institutional action in a truly creative manner and without disrespect to its overall ideality and 
functional complexity. 3 
At the same time, we had better to be aware of the fact that we actually take part in the 
above mechanism of mutual influencing by far not exclusively with consciously pre-planned 
steps and patterns. For there is one brute fact, and this is our Central & Eastern European 
wide impotence resulting from particular historical conditions. For the region’s Communist 
past,  which  spanned  over  nearly  half  a  century  of  detachment  from  the  daily  Western 
European and Atlantic routine, has driven all those concerned to forced paths, diverting them 
from  the  very  chance  of  any  organic  development.  Or,  this  past  made  own  practices 
developed and enforced throughout the West in the meantime, against which we, Hungarians, 
for example, may now call back our own historical (and partly also nostalgic) remembrances 
(to  former  efforts  at  state-building,  bourgeois  revolution,  liberal  governance  up  to  our 
involvement  in  the  First  World  War,  struggles  between  the  two  world  wars,  or,  lastly, 
republican  foundations  during  the  short  coalition  period  after  the  second  worldwide 
catastrophe) at the most,
1 which, however, inevitably and in the strictest sense, had also cut us 
off from contemporary Western European and Atlantic practices developed in their after-war 
recovery and afterwards, by having transformed our traditions into a historical fore pattern 
anchoring in their already distant past. That is, our ideals became in the meantime dated as 
mere remembrances rooted in the very past of Western civilisational patterns, forbidden and 
denied for us at their time, while we could hardly get own experience from their daily 
practices, evolved with them through nearly half a century. Therefore, eventually an d in the 
last analysis, in both facts and ideals we are in a remarkable phase delay. For this very reason, 
the issue is also bound to be raised how much will our overall heritage —nolens, volens—
affect our near future as an in-built impetus given. 
Based upon own potentials, we are already both new members and constituent parts of—
with shared ability also to contribute to—this unifying Europe. Therefore we are expected to 
answer the query for sustainability in a sensitive manner, namely, to rate what kind of future 
can be prognosticated for us in the dilemma of preservation mixed by mutual influences or 
assimilation under the pressure of overweighty partners, and also what kind of role traditions 
historically  evolved  may  play  in  forming  all  this,  defining  its  basic  directions  while 
transforming themselves into a conservative antipode in control of current adaptations, as 
main  factors  to  strengthen  internal  forces  needed  so  much  for  facing  current  challenges 
effectively and in an adequate manner. 
                                                           
1 For some comparative approach, see, e.g., Jenő Szücs, The Three Historical Regions of Europe, Acta Historica 
Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 29 (1983), 131-184. 4 
Of course, plenty of researches have been carried out in Western Europe concerning 
various aspects of such and similar topics, even if in a rather isolated contexture. Neither 
panorama nor developmental perspective has been offered by them till now. As series of 
analyses within the reach of positive law and closed down in its well-established theoretical 
framework, they have been mostly building on their prevailing outlook as some ready-made 
recipe, without sensing the paradigmatic novelty of the total move which is going on anyway 
now with universal historical significance. Consequently, in want of own conceptualisation 
and  methodological  foundation,  they  have  simply  extended  (insufficiently  and  by  far  not 
adequately, by the way) that what is anyhow prevalent as given in their everyday domestic 
routine. And still, own participation with own abilities necessitates own answers, specific of 
own challenges, as has ever been used in—and in a manner worth of—social sciences. 
 
II. Historical Preliminaries 
1. Human Refinement 
The European integration is one of the greatest victories of centuries, perhaps of millennia, as 
a development that may predestinate the mankind’s overall fate for a long period of time. For 
such an institutionalisation of channels of international collaboration on a voluntary basis and 
launched in every step by co-operative participation is a hardly overvaluable advance in the 
homo sapiens’ history. It is to note that not more than ten generations divide us from feudal 
particularism only, which presumed continuous group-fight with altering chances. It might 
result in some profit for occasional winners but it caused mostly lost (if not plain destruction) 
for nations and states concerned. In huge regions of the West of Europe where enemy in the 
proper sense (i.e., external power threatening our commonly shared civilisational values) had 
never menaced survival, mostly also Christian princes, and overlords sworn to the same God 
hankered for, or borne a grudge against, the property of their similia. Castles undamaged we 
admire  in  the  Western  hemisphere  today  as  historical  monuments  are  furnished  with  all 
imaginable  defensive  arts  against  those  (yesterday  perhaps  still  friend  and  fellow-in-arms 
neighbour) rounding on our life, property, spouse, and power equally, while we know that 
eventually no human artifice can save anyone arrived to the top on earth against the intrigue 
of others, aspiring with the same fighting spirit to the same arrival. Well, we may wonder at 
our still prehistory of a nearly recent past, how  the refinement—or self-ennoblement—of 
human race proved to be relative for long centuries: scarcely less than two millennia later that 5 
the  message  of  Christianity  (in  company  of  other  world  religions  transmitting  legacies 
basically concordant with the above) had become the common language of our predecessors.
2 
Coming nearer to our present, just a bit more than half a dozen of generations’ period 
separate us from the age when by force of his arms Napoleon aspired to found a Europe-like 
empire, and our parents still might live red, then brawn and yellow dictatorships that made 
efforts to form global empiredoms by mere power. In history, the borders of causalities and 
coincidences often grow dim, since in a stage of constant and mutual expansion—in a modern 
state of bellum omnium contra omnes, later in variations of waging warfare and concluding 
peace  treaties  (making  place  to  one  another  in  a  forecalculable  sequence),  and,  as  the 
achievement of our modernity, hardly cramped by the so-called international law either then 
or since then—every state actor experiments with optimising its situation legally, by setting in 
sheer power techniques and by  making  a defensive ideology out  of its  actually  followed 
practice  alike  (putting  it  as  a  troubling  issue  to  the  posterity  whether  or  not  in  the  final 
analysis the catch words of the Christianity, ruled by the Church’s adopted politics, or, later 
on, the ones of democracy—that is, the attention to be paid to and by the public opinion—had 
been  confined  to  this);  and,  with  the  wisdom  of  posterity  at  the  most  and  with  no  little 
resignation—most of all post festam—we take notice of the fact that, with some variations in 
resemblance  but  still  coming  from  common  descendence,  the  same  spirit  of  the  age  has 
materialised in one of them and perhaps also in the other, maybe coming out as the winner of 
the given conflict. 
Notwithstanding all this, it was in such a confrontation among nations that international 
law  began  to  regain  new  strengths  (together  with  its  immensely  considerable  and  varied 
professional branchings-off by today), in line with and also resulting in the proliferation of 
international organisations, which were sometimes destined to become straightforwardly a 
legally circumscribed world state substitute, sometimes established to fulfil strictly delimited 
duties, considered as necessary; however, they had a common mark in that they were given a 
particular—and  sui  generis—legal  status.  Today’s  American  hegemony  has  formed  in  the 
same way, in the world-wide interaction of giving and receiving, using all available potentials 
as defined by the actual challenge and the desirable response, which re-contextualises also 
                                                           
2 It is worthwile recalling the fact that sociological essays are used to report about re-feudalisation as a still 
strangely viable phenomenon also in Europe, in the very periphery of the European Union, whose stage of 
development is described most adequately in terms of Pierre Corneille’s drama El Cid, reminding of the Iberian 
states during the 11
th to 13
th centuries. Cf., e.g., Vladimir Shlapentokh, Russia: Privatization and Illegalization of 
Social and Political Life, Michigan State University Department of Sociology [CND (95) 495], 1995. 6 
international law in a new paradigmatic situation.
3 Today this direction is coupled —if not 
identified with the former in its entirety, despite numerous interlocking it has—with the trend 
of globalisation, basically revolving around a world-economic interest. Filled with the taste of 
progressing  in  progress  and  bearing  the  purifying  and  self-recreating  effect  of  the 
Enlightenment, not even these times might we answer otherwise the question once formulated 
by the Academy of Dijon,
4 calling the farsighted vision of Jean-Jacques Rousseau about the 
ennoblement of morals, than by saying that: our instruments are constantly refined—although, 
and with returning generality, endeavours striving to reach the end have in the meantime 
become still more implacable, in result-maximalisation more inconsiderate, because by being 
capable of setting more refined technologies, they may envision a still by far more total effect. 
What and how will be precipitated in our legal thinking and in our theorisation on law 
from all this? According to the shortest reply: much and little at the same time. Theoretical 
reflection seems to be always retarded. This is as if our earlier conditions were too forceful, 
since the possibilities within the prevailing frameworks are almost limitlessly able to pursue 
the old paths undisturbed, by adapting the known ones, and open for cautious developments. 
Nearly  this  is  what  we  can  learn  from  explorations  into  the  historical  logic  of  scientific 
development. Namely, advance is carried on within the frame of paradigms already formed; 
theorising upon new recognitions is achieved by gradually dissolving the tensions which are 
faced in this body of knowledge undertaken unchanged from the earlier period, and, this way, 
also  mitigating  them  in  consideration  of  its  future;  and  it  is  only  somewhen,  at  certain 
historically exceptional periods, that all this may turn to be over the limits of tolerability—
moreover, most frequently not even as the necessary effect of circumstances that cannot be 
explained  otherwise  in  epistemology  than  as  the  issue  generated  by  trout-fly,  secondary, 
merely coincident phenomena, or by external forces, or after a chance of breaking through is 
recognised—when, perhaps, a new paradigm will be born.
5 
Moreover, in law, the practicing of and theorisation on which is unchangedly cultivated 
mostly as closed within state boundaries and predisposed of the own cultural inveteracy, we 
                                                           
3 Robert E. Gooding, Toward an International Rule of Law: Distinguishing International Law-breakers from 
Would-be Law-makers, The Journal of Ethics 9 (2005), 225-246 raises the straightforward issue (at 227, then 
229) that the claim of »rule of law, not of men« formulated within a state has been changed to »rule of law, not 
of states« in relations among states; however, in case of the overdominance by a superpower rosen there is 
hardly any guarantee for voluntary and one-sided moderation—beyond the hope that international co-operation 
will be effective enough to “really internalize the settled rules governing relations between ﾻcivilized nationsﾫ.” 
4 „si le r￩tablissement des sciences et des arts a contribu￩ ￠ ￩purer les mœurs” [whether the development of the 
arts and sciences had a positive effect on morals]. 
5  Thomas S. Kuhn  The  Structure  of  Scientific  Revolutions,  1962.  Cf.  also  Erich  vom  Dietze  Paradigms 
Explained: Rethinking Thomas Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science, Westport, Conn., 2001 and James A. Marcum 
Thomas Kuhn’s Revolution: An Historical Philosophy of Science, 2005. 7 
ourselves seldom become cloven and duplex. Instead, we expand rather our suitable practices 
and habits to new territories—simultaneously as test and experiment—for that we may carry 
on chasing what is already well-known (by its further analytical exploration, synthetic re-
definition in larger contexts, as well as reaffirmation in extrapolations), proceeding on on 
ways that are made safe thereby. It is in this sense that the present haunts. For we are inclined 
to  see  pretence,  opportunity,  and  new  experiment  of  extending  ourselves—our  past  and 
experience—in this new European reality, rather than trying to sense, recognise and theorise it 
as a sui generis actuality, with both readiness measured by and approach adequate to it. 
 
2. The Westphalian Heritage: State and Inter-state Laws 
Anyway, there is some implicitness dominating our jurisprudential thought, functioning as 
sieves of professional socialisation, on the one hand, and as the filtering agent of verification, 
on the other. It may serve as an aggregate of habitual criteria on both sides of the input and 
the output, defining primarily what can be thought of law. 
For us, interestingly here and now, such implicitness is forwarded first of all by taking 
the so-called Westphalian duo—that is, dividing up the law’s world to nation-states, ruled by 
domestic regimes, on the one hand, and international law, serving as the governing principle 
amongst  such states, on the other—as  a basis.  In conformity  with  the  latter’s underlying 
origin, nature and operation (despite huge efforts anyway), international law is until today 
pulpy  and  fluid,  rugged  in  all  its  components  as  forming  day  to  day,
6  since due to its 
occasionality and weakness in centralisation, it is not summed in reliably comprehensive and 
completed doctrine.
7  This is why now —à  propos  the  “international  rule  of  law”—great 
feelings of its defect are formulated, recognising the need of determined steps to overcome it 
through  various  forms  of  promotion.
8  Since it is a common experience that as soon as 
international power balance is split (by the practical dissolution of the League of Nations in 
the late interwar period or the end of bipolarity after the fall of the Soviet Union now), 
hegemonic interest is to prevail again (visibly vis-à-vis others),
9 as backed by the standing and 
well-known celestial solemnity of references made to superb and unchanging principles. 
                                                           
6 László Valki, A nemzetközi jog sajátos társadalmi természete [The specific social nature of international law], 
Budapest, 1981. 
7 Nevertheless, for its demand, see, e.g., Niilo Jääskinen, Back to the Begriffshimmel? A Plea for an Analytical 
Perspective in European Law, in: The Coherence of EU Law: The Search for Unity in Divergent Concepts, ed. S. 
Prechal & B. van Roermund, 2008, 451-461. 
8 Cf., e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law,  European Journal of International Law I 
(1990) & <http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/1/1/4>, 4-32. 
9 Cf., e.g., as a cry out, by Diarmud Rossa Phelan,  It’s God we ought to Crucify, Fiesole, EUI Working Papers: 
Law 92/33. 8 
In turn, national laws are used to be seen in the duality of the continental Civil Law and 
the Anglo-American Common Law (or, in triality, as complemented to by the so-called mixed 
regimes), when their established technicalities, institutional networks, or firm foundations in 
basically developed doctrines (or doctrinal outlines) are considered. Here and now, it is not 
their actuality that may be seen as problematic but their unproblematic reception as something 
given from the outset as an exclusive natural fact. For it has some imperialistic undertone 
when the process of ongoing globalisation, sheltering behind all present moves, is also taken 
into account;
10 when it ignores the broadening of the topics of investigations devoted to social 
formalisms by social theories since the beginning of the 20
th century; when it features up the 
standing imprints of Euro-centrism or ethno-centrisms. Since the epoch of Eugen Ehrlich and 
Max Weber, so-called non-state laws as well as the cases of legal pluralisms, deriving from 
some parallel and/or concurring predominance, have also called the undivided attention of 
jurisprudential (legal sociological and anthropological) research.
11 Or, when we are invariably 
footed in the so-called Western Law, we are tempted to attribute low relevant significance to 
legal traditions far from us and named simply as “others”, lived and living almost undisturbed 
in the greater part of our globe, that is, to traditions which we consider mostly as parts of their 
religion but which are often the indistinguishable and by far not definitely unsuccessful parts 
of a comprehensive world-outlook, working well in their own traditional environment and 
medium.
12 And this narrow-minded focus may have proved to be persistent with us at a time 
when we actually have not yet developed any truly general or, in the strict sense of the word, 
universal legal theory
13 —unless we count as such with such caricatures as afforded by Hans 
Kelsen’s positivism (as to a European continental version), or the analytical trend (as to the 
British  pattern),  in  addition  to  (as  the  historical  predecessor  of  all  jurisprudence  ever 
undertaken) the catholicos claim for universality as offered by the philosophy of natural law. 
 
 
 
                                                           
10 As World Bank literature makes the allegation apparent, cf. Csaba Varga, Reception of Legal Patterns in a 
Globalising Age, in: Globalization, Law and Economy [Proceedings of the 22
nd IVR World Congress], IV, ed. N. 
López Calera, ARSP Beiheft 109, 2007, 85-96. 
11 For basic issues related, cf. Csaba Varga, Theory of Law  – Legal Ethnography, Or the Theoretical Fruits of 
Inquiries into Folkways, Sociologia del Diritto, XXXVII (2010), 82-101. 
12  Csaba Varga,  Comparative Legal Cultures? Renewal by Transforming int o a Genuine Discipline,  Acta 
Juridica Hungarica 48 (2007), 95-113 & <http://akademiai.om.hu/content/gk485p7w8q5652x3/fulltext.pdf>. 
13 As a demand for it, cf. Csaba Varga, Összehasonlító módszer és jogelmélet [Comparative method and legal 
theory, 1973], in: Csaba Varga,  Útkeresés:  Kísérletek  –  kéziratban  [The  search  for  a  path:  unpublished 
manuscripts], Budapest, 2001, 97-101. 9 
3. The European Law 
Where  can  one  find  the  place  of  European  law?  For  that  what  may  be  seen  from  the 
representations  of  European  legal  literature  as  a  synthesis  is  of  quite  uncertain  contours 
without theoretical message, even if spiced with historico-political arguments occasionally, 
mostly  covering  or  substituting  to  national  interest  pressed.  Even  in  monographies  the 
cacophony of incidental remarks can only assure some perspective, namely, from outside. The 
nationally diversified normative stuff will remain separated, perhaps with the sole exception 
of doctrinal propositions to prepare some common codes of the European Union. They, in 
turn, seem to reincarnate the idea having once prevailed in conceptual jurisprudence,
14 with 
abstract  notionality  defined  within  an  established  systemicity  that  is  backed  by  the 
professionally shared belief in the creative force of human rationality. This is completed by 
the hope that constructions thusly gained will embody final rationality. 
We can perhaps get a more sensitive picture by also counting with the fact that „Forging 
a legal Europe and post modernism are just complementary to one another.”
15 For in this case, 
too,  the  multiple  mediations  through  which  the  formalisms  in  the  operation  of  European 
institutions  are  filtered—with  priority  guaranteed  to  common  institutional  manifestations 
(directives and decisions) while, on the other end of the operational mechanism, a through and 
through filtration will be achieved by the national agent interpreting all these (just enabling us 
to conclude that, after all, neither “supranational monism” nor „centrality of domestic law” 
taken separately but a compromise reached by both simultaneously shall prevail
16)—push us 
back from the illusory hope of certainty to the mere facticity of uncertainty. 
From  the  perspective  of  methodological  thinking,  we  may  perceive  the  same 
transformation process already realised in social sciences at an early stage of the 20
th century, 
when the notional purity of rule- or statutory positivisms was corroded by sociologisms also 
entering the field, that is, by the positivism of facts.
17 Nurtured by earlier expectations (and 
not without firm grounds), all this had first imprinted minds with the fear of genuine anarchy; 
getting gradually replaced by a functionalist view of society, which could only take a more or 
less solid theoretical form after long debates on the issue of priority and attempts at final 
subjection, by the second half of  the century. On its turn, this new concept was from the 
                                                           
14 Cf. Csaba Varga, Leibniz und die Frage der rechtlichen Systembildung, in: Materialismus und Idealismus im 
Rechtsdenken: Geschichte und Gegenwart, ed. K. A. Mollnau, 1987, ARSP Beiheft 31, 114-127. 
15 André-Jean Arnaud Pour une pensée juridique européenne, 1991, 300. 
16 Massimo La Torre, Legal Pluralism as Evolutionary Achievement of Community Law,  Ratio Juris 12 (1999), 
192. 
17 For the debate in  Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie during the years 1916 and 1917, see Hans 
Kelsen und die Rechtssoziologie: Auseinandersetzungen mit Hermann U. Kantorowicz, Eugen Ehrlich und Max 
Weber, ed. S. L. Paulson, 1993. 10 
beginning based on plural actors and the endless series of social interactions, changing the 
mythical definitivum of some primary act, or creative intervention and final determination, to 
the functional interdependence of partial complexes in actual co-operation. This has resulted 
in  the  dissolution  of  legal  positivism
18  while arriving at a new, relatively well -balanced 
state.
19 
Once the certainty of all the uncertainties inherent in the state of post  modernism is 
reflected upon the complex of European law, one can reach some points of orientation. First 
of all there is a striking common experience in that everything even in a loose connection to it 
seems to have been permeated by a kind of “missionary zeal”.
20 This is characterised by both 
its weigh and extraordinarity, formative of the future of European history, and the fact that it 
lacks any strictly circumscribable subject. For today “a reactive, event-driven and context-
dependent approach to EU legal studies” is the mainstream,
21 considering the fact that the 
“European Community law represents more evidently perhaps than most other subjects an 
intricate web of politics, economics and law. It virtually calls out to be understood by [...] an 
interdisciplinary, contextual or critical approach.”
22 
The  medium  itself  in  the  womb  of  which  all  this  is  to  happen  is  the  fluid  state  of 
ceaseless being something and becoming something else as well,
23 since “The EU, after all, is 
a polity in the making”.
24 The European law as it is at any given time is the first of those 
factors shaping the commonness in Europe at any time; and what is known presently as the 
                                                           
18 Cf., e.g., Csaba Varga, What is to Come after Legal Positivisms are Over? Debates Revolving around the 
Topic of »The Judicial Establishment of Facts«, in: Theorie des Rechts und der Gesellschaft: Festschrift für 
Werner Krawietz zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. M. Atienza, E. Pattaro, M. Schulte, B. Topornin & D. Wyduckel, 
2003, 657-676 and—exemplifying the positivism’s dissolution in a case-study—Csaba Varga, Meeting Points 
between the Traditions of English–American Common Law and Continental-French Civil Law (Developments 
and  Experience  of  Postmodernity  in  Canada),  Acta  Juridica  Hungarica  44  (2003),  21-44  & 
<http://www.akademiai.com/content/x39m7w437134167l/?p=056215b52c56447c8f9631a8d8baada3&pi=1>. 
19 Cf. Csaba Varga,  Macrosociological Theories of  Law: From the  ﾻLawyer’s World Conceptﾫ to a Social 
Science  Conception  of  Law,  in:  Soziologische  Jurisprudenz  und  realistische  Theorien  des  Rechts,  ed.  E. 
Kamenka,  R.  S.  Summers  &  W.  Twining,  1986,  197-215  &  also  in 
<http://drcsabavarga.wordpress.com/2010/10/25/varga-law-and-philosophy-%E2%80%93-papers-in-legal-
theory-1994/>. 
20 Neil Walker, Legal Theory and the European Union: A 25
th Anniversary Essay, Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 25 (2005), 586. 
21 Walker (note 20), 583. 
22 The first time by Francis Snyder, New Directions in European Community Law,  Journal of Law and Society 
14 (1987), 167. 
23 Synthetising the research of decades to identify and explain some definitive marks of the law’s existence, its 
process-like character in standing flux of gradual transubstantiation is already described by Csaba Varga, »Law«, 
or  »More  or  Less  Legal«?  Acta  Juridica  Hungarica  34  (1992),  139-146  &  also  in 
<http://drcsabavarga.wordpress.com/2010/10/25/varga-law-and-philosophy-%E2%80%93-papers-in-legal-
theory-1994/> [/Macrosociological Theories of Law]. 
24 Jo Hunt & Jo Shaw,  Fairy Tale of Luxembourg? Reflections on Law and Legal Scholarship in European 
Integration,  in: 
<http://64.233.183.104/search?q=cache:F42D5KPUYG8J:www.sheffield.ac.uk/content/1/c6/06/90/87/Hunt%2>, 
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European Union is the prime factor to form the European law—in an interdependence and 
with a mutually conditioning force that, beyond the dynamics of their mutual effects and self-
sustaining  output,  there  is  almost  no  fix(ed)  point  to  relate  to  them  in  the  manner  of 
Archimedes. Therefore one may state it without sheerly rhetorical overestimation reaching a 
dead-end,  that  “there  is  simply  no  single  answer  to  questions  such  as:  what  is  the  legal 
constitutional nature of the EU, and what is the role of the law in the governance of the 
EU?”
25 For all this is about the specificity of the European law’s ontological nature and its 
self-determination through the mutual definition of the forces working in its just-so-being.
26 
Just  in  the  way  as  the  European  law’s  criterial  component  “conditionality  attached  to 
supremacy is not a temporary aberration, but a permanent feature of the EU constitutional 
order.”
27—since it is also to show those apparently (self-)contradictory features that can at all 
be  interpreted  within  the  dynamism  of  the  total  whole,  taken  as  a  process.  Even  the 
constitutional foundations of its structure can be best described in the enigmatic but reliable 
language of legal and political philosophy—in the way, for instance, that the relationship 
between the Union and the domestic national orders is “pluralistic rather than monistic, and 
interactive rather than hierarchical”.
28 
In the evergreen polemics of legal theory whether it is the rule that makes the law (as 
suggested by the transformation of regola into rules with the ancient Romans and by the 
axiomatic conceptualisation in early modern continental Europe
29) or the law’s presence, with 
the quality of juridicity, will only be revealed through the judicial event (as ever professed by 
the experimental pragmatism of the Anglo-Saxon wisdom), there is a new contribution to the 
underlying issue by the conclusion, maybe shocking for the first time, according to which 
“The European Union’s legal system has become the most effective international legal system 
in  existence,  standing  in  clear  contrast  to  the  typical  weakness  of  international  law  and 
international courts.” For all this is nothing but the outcome of the fact that in the political 
processes of the European Union the European Court(s) of Justice and the national courts 
have become co-actors in imposing a common will, called European law, on the governments 
of member states.
30 
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26 Gerade-so-Sein in description of the ontological singularity in any particular actuality by Lukács. 
27 Hunt & Shaw (note 24), 14. 
28 Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European Commonwealth, 1999, 
118. 
29 Cf. Csaba Varga,  Differing Mentalities of Civil Law and Common Law? The Issue of Logic in Law,  Acta 
Juridica Hungarica 48 (2007), 401-410 & <http://akademiai.om.hu/content/b0m8x67227572219/fulltext.pdf>. 
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III. Analogies 
1. Solar System with Planets 
There is a methodologically inspiring symbolic expression provided by the metaphor of “solar 
system with planets”, based on the various forms of interaction and interdependence between 
the intellectual tradition embodied by the ius commune as the once European jurisprudents’ 
law, on the one hand, and its local applications, on the other. According to a learned author, 
“Manlio Bellomo—L’Europa del diritto commune 6
th ed. (Roma: 1993) 205–206—has used the imagery of the 
Ius commune as the sun and the iura propria, the legal norms of kingdoms, principalities, and city states as the 
planets  to  explain  the  relationship  of  the  Ius  commune  and  iura  propria.  The  metaphor  is  perceptive  and 
accurate. The sun is not an inert mass, without energy or gravity that does not exercise any influence on the 
planets. To describe the sun as a great theoretical star in the sky that has no real life or influence of its own 
would be silly. On the other hand, the planets have their own conditions, forces, norms that regulate their self-
contained worlds. Each planet has a different set of rules, but each is affected in different ways and from a 
different distance by the energy of the sun. No planet would reject the sun; it would be folly and unthinkable. 
The result would be chaos for the planet’s system. My conclusions can be stated succinctly: The Ius commune 
was not bookish law, was not the law of the greats, to be read, savored, and returned to the shelf, was not learned 
law in contrast to real law. It was the cauldron from which all European legal systems emerged.”
31 
Such a metaphor, I guess, can serve as a convincing analogy to describe the simultaneously 
centrifugal and centripetal, unending moves characteristic of the cases of legal pluralism, and 
most  of  all,  the  actualisation/implementation  of  the  European  law  as  unity  in  principle, 
showing certain diversity of practice at the same time. Otherwise expressed, this means that 
once some depth is actually reached by the process of European integration, there will also be 
some  inertia  and  gravitational  force  in  work  as  well,  which  may  ensure  that  its  law, 
independently of how it operates in  fact,  will also  be able to  exert its  continued impact, 
feeding back, of course, the challenges it is to respond to, even if mostly in a rather indirect 
manner. 
As it will be cleared up in  the following paragraphs  in  more details,  it is  the pluri-
directional move by plural actors (with the overwhelmingly massive force that is to be formed 
anyhow in the womb of such movements) that will specify the particularity of the operation of 
European law. 
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2. Pre-modernity, Modernity, Post-modernity 
The  amalgam  that  the  operation  of  the  European  Union  is,  exhibits  a  variety  of  features 
ranging from premodern, through modern, to postmodern. 
Premodern,  insofar  as  it  genuinely  reverberates  with  echoes  of  the  ius  commune 
tradition. 
Yet, at the same time, European law exhibits features of modernity as well. It carries on 
with the tradition of legal positivism, yet at the same time, we recognise the process of the 
classic nation-state being transposed rigidly into the rather different setting of the succeeding 
new age, in tandem perhaps with the potential stigmas attached to being out of date, and 
showing signs of being artificially produced—a result of the forceful nature of the process. 
Efforts and attempts aimed at producing European common law have thus far been located 
along  more  or  less  exclusive  codification  strategies,  and  have  attributed  primacy  to  the 
systemic idea,
32  and subscribe to the notion of  law being susceptible to being fixed in a 
chosen form onto the skeletal structure provided by the formulae of rules. 
Additionally, the air of postmodernity also permeates this sphere. This becomes tangible 
through the way the innumerable directives (that are not only capable of creating internal 
tensions among one another, but even of completely cancelling the effects of each other
33) are 
to practically overwrite the body of rules comprising European law. The fundamental cause of 
this reversal is that these rules are only enforceable through actualisation by the courts, that is, 
via adjudication governed by value judgments and the weighing of conflicting interests, 
which are essentially authoritative proclamations produced in decision-making scenarios. 
This is a post modern construct, accepting the primacy of principles over rules to the 
extent that, for example, the equality of languages natively dissolves in the cacophony of 
regulations that which (although in and of itself can be perceived as merely text) m ay 
nevertheless no longer be monocultural even in its simple textuality,
34  since it is floating 
above the individual culture specific languages of all member states. Also to the extent that 
the community actions are —intentionally,  due  to  one  of  the  most  fundamental  principles 
                                                           
32 For their variegated adventure, cf. Csaba Varga, Codification as a Socio-historical Phenomenon, Budapest, 
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33 On the effect of implementation shaking systemic coherence and functioning with alien elements built in, see 
Attila Harmathy, Jogrendszerünk átalakulása és az Európai Unió joga [The transformation of our legal system 
and the law of the European Union], in:  Ius privatum - ius Commune Europae: Liber Amicorum, Studia Ferenc 
Mádl dedicata, ed. Christa Bán, Budapest, 2001, 125-134. 
34 In addition to concurring pluralism of languages as carriers of texts, also the want of texts embodying express 
rules may make laws to float. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Is Common Law Law?  California Law Review 77 
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determining the nature of this construct—subjugated to the various specific interpretations 
(arbitrary choices) produced by member states based either on powers afforded by a status of 
local autonomy or other powers exclusive to the given jurisdiction. Also to the extent that, by 
extending the freedom of the choice of the law, it gives rise to the coexistence of competing 
national forums, which combined with the freedom of contract and of enterprise ultimately 
gives way to a certain favoured legal system (or systems) gaining monopoly status along with 
the other (or others) becoming hollow from a practical perspective (since even their remaining 
degree of sovereignty is thusly rendered inconsequential). In other words, also to the extent 
that  although  the  powers  of  the  national  (as  in  member  state)  entities  are  theoretically 
preserved, nevertheless, in the practical realm, a continent-wide globalisation has (already) 
been put into motion by practically almost fully liberalising the marketplace of initiatives and 
allowing freedom of choice among the various relevant legal regulations. Consequently, the 
potential outcome of this process could be that in fact the status of the state may soon become 
largely nominal indeed—because of the freedom of enterprise and of commerce. The reason 
for this is that in the case of giant commercial enterprises comprised of freely constructed 
concentrations of influence that are the most successful in the battle to acquire the largest 
market  share,  the  de  facto  force  upholding  order  increasingly  resides  with  the  players 
themselves, as their legal agreements tend to designate as arbitrators of their potential legal 
wrangling  certain  agencies  commissioned  to  act  as  forums  producing  rulings  on  their 
disagreements.  When  the  relevant  provisions  are  composed  with  an  appropriate  level  of 
sophistication, it is even possible to create a legal construct, whereby even the courts of the 
European Union may end up having a rather limited practical influence over these paralegal 
or non-legal procedures. 
 
IV. The Set-up of European Law 
1. The Want of Legal Culture 
Well,  using  a  multi-tiered  image  of  the  potential  wholeness  of  law,
35  it  is  possible to 
distinguish three different layers: 
 
law 
surface level 
(legal rules, case law, etc.) 
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and Reality: Readings in Finnish Legal Theory, ed. L. D. Erikson & S. Hurri, Helsinki, 403. 15 
legal culture 
(legal concepts, general principles, lawyer’s methodology) 
deep structure 
 
—and strange as it may sound, our conclusion is that so far the legal setup of the European 
Union appears to have reached only the first level.
36 To put it differently, the culture and core 
structure of European law, i.e., its conceptual, theoretical, and methodological assets, and its 
doctrine (in the sense of a  Rechtsdogmatik
37) have not been fully formulated, its wholeness 
has not been attained by far. 
Truly, that which is commonly referred to as the objectification of law
38 has been present 
for quite a long time, and it has materialised in the form of a solid amalgam block of a rather 
chaotic composition. The contracts concluded with the European Union,  the directives and 
other positive sources of law emanating from the representative and governmental bodies 
representing the European Union, furthermore, the corpus of its own juridical rulings —
beyond the transposed and adopted elements, i.e., in addition to the body of acquis—have 
objectified the law. Nonetheless, to this day no palpable certainty or generality has evolved 
out of this: neither do we see an already crystallised form of legal conceptualisation, nor do 
we notice a strategic construction happening along a set of principles producing a balanced 
construct,  and  even  whatever  could  be  understood  as  being  a  more-or-less  consensual 
methodology  is  lacking  from  the  process.
39  And certainly, in the absence of all of these 
obviously no genuine doctrine exi sts, unless we consider this term to cover even those 
compendia released by authors (which are subject to being revised or rewritten with perhaps 
daily frequency), that seem to report every single development structured in whatever form of 
a grouping, and which tend to be rather void of genuine thought regardless of being produced 
under the guise of bona fide science. 
Still, the stuff comprised of accumulated normative materials resembles at best—even 
with the best of intentions—the critical mass produced by the layers of deposits formed on top 
of each other left behind by a long tradition of Anglo-Saxon case-law. So it resembles an 
                                                           
36 Thomas Wilhelmsson, Jack-in-the-Box Theory of European Community Law, in: Dialectic of Law... (note 35), 
449. 
37 Cf. Csaba Varga, Law and its Doctrinal Study (On Legal Dogmatics),  Acta Juridica Hungarica 49 (2008), 
253-274 & <http://akademiai.om.hu/content/g352w44h21258427/fulltext.pdf> 
38 Cf. Csaba Varga,  Chose juridique et réification en droit: Contribution à la théorie marxiste sur la base de 
l’Ontologie  de  Lukács,  in:  Archives  de  Philosophie  du  Droit  25  (1980),  385-411  &  also  in 
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incomprehensible heap that can only be penetrated via the use of some method of creating 
subgroupings based on typification,
40 which then has the effect of reducing the apparently 
inherent, native chaos. This can be achieved by identifying certain precedent-blocks that do in 
fact  exhibit  truly  significant  differentiating  features  when  examined  from  a  specific 
perspective; yet we are well advised to keep in mind that no one such structural construct 
should be considered absolute or exclusively valid in its given form, nor is it in any way 
predestinated, because using a different set of principles or method in trying to create/perceive 
order can produce another reasonable breakdown of interconnected units. Consequently, it 
would be just as misguided a self-deception to call this an order or a system
41 as this would be 
to recognise some sort of correlation in the very formal deductive thinking applied some time 
ago by  Leibniz when attempting to form the corpus of the perfect language, the total 
conceptual system, and the finalised knowledge (the ghost of which also resurfaced in 
connection with the attempted configuration/treatment of law by scientific methodology as a 
system in David Hilbert’s axiomatism-ideal
42 as being the test of genuine scientific value), 
which mandated that all individual components be attributed the prestige of an axiom,
43 due 
to what in reality was a complete lack of theorems, while with all of this would merely create 
the trap of self-destruction because our procedure would in fact cause the notion of axiomatics 
per se become totally senseless. 
If  we  dared  even  to  arrive  at  any  conclusion  based  on  this  negation  and  finding  of 
incompleteness, then our first one would obviously be that the developmental process as it 
stands today can only be understood as being partial, because in our view even its already 
established  would-be  foundations  and  its  superstructure  to  be  occupied  are  lacking:  we 
perceive  the  presence  of  only  coordinated  intentions  and  actions,  rather  than  that  of  an 
actually unified community.
44 We consider as the next relevant observation the notion that 
there is a remarkable absence of a fully developed com mon legal culture, which results in 
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exclusive final ordering principle. See The Division and Classification of the Law, ed. J. A. Jolowicz, 1970. 
41 Cf. Csaba Varga, Law and its Approach as a System,  Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 21 
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42 “I believe that all that can at all be an object of scholarly thought is, by achieving its maturity for theory-
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Denken, Mathematische Denken LXXVIII (1918), 415 [reprint in: From Kant to Hilbert: A Source Book in the 
Foundations of Mathematics, ed. W. B. Ewald, 1996, 1105-1115]. 
43 Cf. Csaba Varga, The Quest for Formalism in Law: Ideals of Systemicity and Axiomatisability between 
Utopianism  and  Heuristic  Assertion,  Acta  Juridica  Hungarica  50  (2009),  1-30  & 
<http://www.akademiai.com/content/k7264206g254078j/>. 
44 Just as one signal, as to sociological foundations, see  Olivier De Schutter, Europe in Search of its Civil 
Society, European Law Journal 8 (2002), 198-207. 17 
numerous further retardations, thereby multiplying the amplification of its own effect. And 
finally—as  our  third,  although  somewhat  quietly  whispered  observation—we  would  like 
voice our increasingly strongly held belief that in European law—a giant conglomerate of 
uncertain generality (due to all of its components being fragmented by special as well as 
conflicting  interests)—the  specific  details  of  common  desires  and  commitments  can  be 
overwritten by partial aims that appear to show an increasing level of independent existence. 
And  in  this  we  can  expect  a  result  no  better  than  something  improvised:  a  step-by-step 
progress,  predictable  planning  by  default  hampered  by  compromises,  because  what  could 
otherwise  be  conceptually  coherent  progress  can  easily  be  (and  predominantly  is) 
overwhelmed by ad hoc answers produced with daily regularity. In other words, we have 
what is an institutionally well-formed giant structure, which has been filled with meaning and 
is furthermore operated by a well-established bureaucracy, where nonetheless we notice that 
the hands have been taken of the steering wheel. Consequently, individual agents are doing 
whatever they feel most appropriate with their powers. And unless this actually leads to some 
serious unexpected malfunction (materialising in a scandal as an eventual political outcome, 
and in a breakdown or loss of confidence in terms of the institutional operation), then we can 
be certain that daily management shall cover and smooth this over by keeping in or pushing 
into the limelight whatever current affair topic arising from the latest conflict happens to be 
the most appealing to the public’s interest. 
So everything here is a derivative; no single part is actually original yet—since it is not 
self-generating, rather all of it is generated. Or, as it is quintessentially expressed: “The law of 
the EU is not the ﾻEuropean legal cultureﾫ but the product of the European legal cultures.”
45 
So however hard we try we are at this time unable to locate a „common legal grammar”
46 that 
would be comprised of common concepts, thinking, and of uniform attitudes toward law. The 
sense of absence in this regard is felt across the entire community of European legal scholars. 
So it is no wonder then, that those turning disillusionment into positive energy (most often) 
tend to transpose their desire and sense of longing for wholeness into work done toward the 
preparation of a common European codification. This is the form in which the much-desired 
common law’s complexity materialises, involving the fact that the foundations are unclear 
and the American experiment with private (model) codes and unofficial restatements of the 
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46  Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law and the Harmonisation of Private Law in Europe, in:  Towards  a 
European Civil Code, 3
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law is untested. Mostly the path by codes, that is, the imposition of a common body of law as 
centrally enacted is longed for. Leeways are also searched for and the Dutch solution with the 
idea of (national, or individual, that is, case to case) optionality is widely proposed. Even the 
“Common Frame of Reference” is seen as a Trojan horse, substituting to codification while 
advancing its continental conceptuality and systemicity, albeit in a way deficient of working 
democracy. All this seems to be hold on; the fact notwithstanding that mere principles without 
the commonality of the underlying cultures in the background cannot guarantee legal security. 
And although contracts are the most technical field of all relationships within the bonds of the 
private/civil/business law, what is hitherto elevated to a community level is mostly the chaos 
of  casualism.  All  that  notwithstanding,  however,  gradual  convergence  in  a  kind  of 
frameworking regulation can be surely foreseen. 
The situation is similar in case of the common judiciary as well. The roles and mixed 
styles of, as well as the various interpretations by, the European Court of Justice have recently 
been overviewed so that conclusion as to the nature of pluralism and alleged juristocracy 
characteristic of legal operations of the European Union can be drawn. Roles in substitution to 
both the European Union constitution and internal law harmonisation, extended to penal law, 
representing the entire European Union law and order and working in the law’s silence as 
well,  undecided  whether  in  a  casual  or  precedential  manner  but  striving  for  sensitive 
institutional balance all through, while testing a new large-organisation operational structure, 
are all at stake here.
47 Style is French-type decision making complemented to by English-type 
general-advocating intervention. Interpretation is complex in methods, pluri lingually based, 
fertilising general principles with dubious certainty and foreseeability of the law in end result, 
as fed back by the variety of national reactions and autonomously actualising implementations 
eventually. 
Naturally, the question may be raised, how could a fresh culture in a developmental state 
have its own tradition.
48 Well, as much as this kind of an observation is proposing a sensitive 
excuse, it is just as much based on a misunderstanding, since culture is not a matter of time 
period. So in culture we ought not merely look for the length of time continuum as the sign of 
having been canonised by a sense of tradition, it is not the mere fact of a period of time 
having elapsed, rather what we find more crucial is that the concept that we char acterised as 
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culture be permeated—as a native feature—by the intent to pass tradition on.
49 However 
improvisational  the  present  state  of  the  European  law  is,  by  applying  this  method, 
theoretically we may be able to recognise those places of more intense concentration that do 
in fact point in this kind of a direction, and which therefore are undo ubtedly identifiable as 
being present. Of course, the awareness of tradition building is not enough. For, as its is 
widely expressed, “But the European Union, like any state, needs symbols, memories and 
myths that can be the foci or catalysts of emotional attachment.”
50 However, from another 
perspective—that of the nations adopting the common rules—it is worth pondering the fact 
that the instruments of European law tend to just be tossed mechanically onto the pre-existing 
traditional body of law without being organically integrated, or at least an attempt being made 
at their successful integration. For the “European rules are literally copied and inserted into 
domestic  legislation,  without  even  any  attempt  to  integrate  them  into  a  new  coherent 
whole.”
51 And this holds the fact notwithstanding that the genuine effects shaping domestic 
laws can be characterised as depending upon factors on the merge of the extra-legal as all “it 
is less a matter of positive law than of legal culture.” Consequently, the supposed interaction 
taking  place  in  the  cultural  context,  which  is  in  fact  defined  as  being  based  on  mutual 
relations, will be void of plurality, and will just lead to unilateralist isolation. Furthermore, 
this is taking place within the framework of a process that we have to identify as something 
being  governed by the  supranational  within the national  as  a “currently  undergoing  legal 
acculturation”.
52 Yet, this gives us the same sense of hope we have just referred to above, 
because it is easy to imagine that the series of national acculturations occurring due to the 
“shock of globalization” shall eventually feed back into the slow  formation of the whole 
structure.  In  other  words,  these  immensely  elaborate  complexes  include  certain  hidden 
potentials of wiggle room and influence exerting mechanisms, which are hardly discoverable 
in advance, yet at the same time are capable of acting counter to the forecasted directions and 
already settled issues to a decisive degree. 
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In sum, culture is defined as a community pattern, a collective programming of minds.
53 
Legal culture, differentiated from mere uses and skills and attitudes, is also defined as a 
pattern of thinking (in construction and reconstruction continued) with a pre -selective force 
which, as part of the law’s genuine ontology, gets shaped by each and every of us within the 
given  culture,  even  if  majored  mostly  by  legal  professionals.
54  Many  objectifications 
notwithstanding,  the  European  Union’s  legal  culture  is  deficient,  reduced  to  surface 
manifestations,  stimulated  by  mostly  borrowed  components.  With  a  variety  of  available 
typifications  within  the  Union,  the  issue  can  also  be  raised  which  of  the  national  laws’ 
components  are  getting  unified  and  what  is  to  remain  from  participating  national  legal 
cultures if their organic unities are atomised as freely selectable elements. 
 
2. Grand-System Functioning Implemented 
So what we may notice then is that all of our legal knowledge acquired so far has been 
rendered  senseless,  since  it  has  been  overwritten  by  the  way  European  law  has  been 
functioning. So we now have a new order, which is developing as an open system. Certainly, 
there are given cornerstones, such as values, principles, and quite a lot of rules. Nevertheless, 
all of these are transformed into appreciable order, and more significantly, a system with 
foreseeable  future  developmental  stages  programmed  in  advance  only  by  their  actual 
contemporary interpretation. Still, none of the components constituting this functioning unit 
are capable of serving us as a point (or points) of departure—as axioms—when attempting to 
describe the general nature of the range of its systemic reach, its structure, future processes 
launched  in  its  name,  and  normatively  referenced  correlations  thereof.  In  essence,  this  is 
such
55 that each and every element of it is natively contextualised and pre-positioned, that is, 
it in and of itself does not possess a definitive force, so it is only in some sort of flexible and 
transient  (i.e.,  specifically  actualised)  conjunction  with  the  others  that  it  is  ca pable  of 
exhibiting definitive force. But its contextualisation and positioning are provided by its actual 
environment at any given time, that is, its openness toward the exterior, its strategic and 
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tactical choices in taking on the challenges posed by the real world as its surroundings. In 
other words, internally it disciplines according to what is concurrent, because it deals with the 
questions to be answered within its relatively closed system, but mostly not in any way that 
would  result  in  achieving  any  degree  of  authoritative  certainty,  that  is,  exclusivity  or 
singularity without alternatives.  It  activates with the tools of forum, scope of power, and 
decision, with which it always closes off (reseals) its system within the realm of the here and 
now at any given time; however this then does not in and of itself become the root of the same 
or other forums, scopes of power, or decisions belonging to the consecutive phase, so the only 
real derivative is that the carriers of today’s processes shall—theoretically and according to 
the notion of what is expectable—be founded on the previous system’s state of systemic self-
closure. This is because these cornerstones themselves are divergent: they are facing various 
different directions while carrying different potentials as well, that is, in and of themselves 
they  are  of  significance,  but  they  do  not  form  a  closed  system,  therefore  its  particular 
interpretation on any given day is always (in)formed by their continuous balancing based on 
unending updating. 
Therefore we believe that envisioning any sort of counter-posed or perhaps antagonistic 
bipolar relation would be fundamentally off-target, it would precisely deny the basic idea of 
the European Union itself. The reason for this is that we do not see this as a case of the 
European entity facing off with all the national ones, rather the former is a central (directly 
and  exclusively  communal)  forum  existing  along  with  those  of  the  member  states’,  and 
making decisions regarding their affairs (at least in an indirect way), while the latter are all 
European entities themselves. As it is being stated nowadays, the judges of national courts 
themselves are (or, in fact should be) obliged to conduct  even the more intimate/internal 
affairs as European judges, in essence keeping in mind the principles governing a Europe that 
is becoming increasingly more integrated.
56 But the issue whether this is a dream, an agenda 
on the field of many desiderata, or a path actually followed with teleological consciousness 
towards an end with no alternatives—that is, a dynamei
57 in this very sense—will only be 
assessed in a perspective from the posterity. 
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3. With Legal Pluralism in Perspective 
Legal pluralism is the case especially of the European Union,
58 “when it contains inconsistent 
rules of recognition that cannot be legally resolved from within the system.”
59 
In order to contain and set a final limit to the process of pluralisation that had been 
becoming increasingly arbitrary, the European Court of Justice has declared and has had it 
declared three times that it has primacy and supremacy. For, according to its founding charter, 
it “is entitled to definitively answer all questions of European law”
60 and, as concluded by the 
doctrine based on its own jurisprudence, “is entitled to determine what constitutes an issue of 
European law”
61 and “has supremacy over all conflicting rules of national law”
62—without all 
this being by far not  yet sufficient to be in and of itself capable of guaranteeing that no 
overlapping and inconsistency occur.
63 
This is exactly the root of the hope-filled desire that if we could somehow interpret the 
entire European legal  system’s structure—and  within it the ongoing dynamics  created by 
omnipresent,  unavoidable  conflicts,  and  the  ad-hoc  system  of  providing  the  resolutions 
thereof—within the framework of the perspective of limited pluralism, then the end result 
could be a more controllable overall scenario. As the proposition forwarded suggests, “the 
pluralist model provides a comprehensive framework within which these inconsistent claims 
can  coexist.  Provided  that  the  practical  conflict  within  this  model  remains  potential,  and 
actual disputes are avoided, this can provide a stable, even a long-lasting, form of settlement.” 
By the force of this, “It encourages the Court of Justice to interpret European law in a manner 
that will be palatable to national courts, and, at the same time, discourages national courts 
from blindly insisting on the primacy of national rules. In short, the competing supremacy 
claims may serve to create an atmosphere of cooperation between the courts, where each side 
has an incentive to strive to respect the position and tradition of the other.”
64 
Well, we have every right to view—at first sight—these kinds of (and similar) attempts 
to find a solution as arising from a sense of paralysis, and characterise it as a valiant yet 
laughably Utopist; after all, it is a rather rare occurrence in history that a large structure would 
purposefully hinder its own process of attempting to reach what would otherwise be a state of 
perfection in relation to its desired rule of rationality, by incorporating structural components 
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that create confusion and impede its own progress. But as soon as we take it for granted that 
the European Union—as it exists today—could only have been formed from its predecessor 
formations and the latter’s deformities in such a way that it created its unity from the inter-
national and the national (derived from the entities that are the member states) —where the 
former enjoys primacy, but the latter maintains the right of updating vis-à-vis itself—with 
only a limited number of guarantees used as the glue, then we are forced to apply a dose of 
reality and be grounded in our thinking. And this then is the confirmation of the fact that this 
is a machine that is far from being able to guarantee smooth operation; yet it is exactly due to 
the structure affording its inherent forces (which are at the same time of a centripetal and 
centrifugal nature) a large degree of free flow and play, that an uninterrupted dynamism is 
present,  which  advances  or  may  advance  the  cause  of  the  common  Europe  through  the 
contemporaneous processes behind unity and diversity—that is, those of partial autonomies 
grouped under the umbrella of a single overriding dominion—and through the temporal chain 
of solutions dissolving conflicts arising from them. 
But if this is so, then it follows from this that we pose the question: can we truly call 
pluralism what we are talking about here. If it is religious commandments or ethical rules, 
territorial customs, mercantile ususes, sets of professional expectations or self-regulations of 
associations that fall within the system of referential gravitational pull of law, then the right of 
pluralism  to  exist  is truly legitimate, because it is  independently existing and operational 
dynamic entities that find themselves on a common platform on an ad-hoc basis, and here it is 
indeed  the  law  (the  formal  positing  by  the  status  of  statehood)  that  happens  to  do  the 
referencing; but that which is being referenced, nevertheless, is contributing / may contribute 
its own essence and criteriality—in an unchanged state. However, European legal order—as 
we saw earlier—has a certain multi-polar nature, whereby a few of the European Union’s 
institutions of “ﾻmixedﾫ authority”—in which “the power-sharing composition […] does not 
[…], in practice, work in a clear way”
65—do in fact carry on with their legislative, executive, 
and judiciary tasks, but they will only be able to apply the end results thereof in a precarious 
structural position (addressing mostly the state institutions and citizens of the member states), 
where these national state agencies on the one hand adopt these results in one way or another 
(or  refuse  to  do  so  by  the  means  of  some  technical  manoeuvre),  but  on  the  other  hand, 
subsequently the adoption of these community norms become target for challenge (based on 
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the  method  of  adoption  or  the  shortcomings  of  the  adopted  norms)  either  by  other  state 
agencies or individual citizens (or some organised group formation thereof) in front of either 
the national courts of the same member state, or some community level forum. So, on the one 
hand then, the community-level entity has no true independent life, since its only task and 
raison  d’être  is  the  representation  and  management  of  the  community  interlinking  the 
member states. On the other hand, all that is derived from all this member state officialdom is 
not simply a reflex or projection of the centrally posited, but inevitably creative weighing and 
adaptation as well, which among themselves (and especially within the sphere of these acts 
layered on top of each other), and in conjunction with interpretations by other member states, 
and naturally, also in light of the general community perspective, provide a fertile ground for 
a series of possible conflicts to occur. 
Yet still, the legal order of the European Union has no other life than the dynamism 
inherent in this. And this then, including its tensions and resolutions, continuously results in 
both solutions and repeated accumulation of conflicts within the institutional manifestation of 
what is, after all, a communal existence. 
It  is  this  complexity,  and  the  slow  and  uncertain  organic  integration  similar  to  the 
theoretical solution mentioned above (or more precisely: from the inherent order-out-of-chaos 
philosophy that is ultimately the hidden core here), that may be the reason why—until this 
day—it remains practically unmentioned that one of the European Court of Justice’s prime 
function would be to foster the process of the European legal order becoming internally more 
coherent  and  functioning  harmoniously,  which  task  and  the  latter’s  completion,  however, 
“remains under-theorized, [...] remained relatively unaffected by the rich legal-philosophical 
literature on adjudication”.
66 
 
V. The Functioning of European Law 
1. Multipolar Centripetality/Centrifugality 
The  metaphor  of  the  solar  system  as  a  sub-systemic  part  of  the  galaxy  describes  such  a 
relational sphere of the masses inside—which are moving along their path amidst the relevant 
physical  forces—that  is  derived  from  their  mutually  relative  positioning  during  their 
continuous movement, and the organising principles and facts connected to energy, mass, and 
position (as basic attributes) of which are depicted by our human culture of the modern era 
through  the  laws  of  physics.
67  The  paths  of  these  masses  are  at  once  cent ripetal  and 
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centrifugal—as they are at all times balanced—and are defined by interrelations derived from 
the given quantitative characteristics of the given positions. In the realm of sociality, with the 
metaphor applied to ius commune, we can see a different equation, where we have polyphony 
resulting from the centrifugal forces gradually forming national separations (started by towns, 
princes,  etc.)  within  the  monophony  of  a  Christian  Europe,  with  these  forces  eventually 
overwhelming the counterbalancing exerted by the centripetal nature of the culture justified 
by and justifying through the common tradition. 
The legal reality of the European Union is derived from its bipolar structure, because 
when its centrally posited rules are locally integrated into practice (which is defined by the 
sovereignty of the nation state), this is done under circumstances whereby (and while) even 
law posited autonomously by the sovereign nation state is subjugated to that posited by the 
European Union, since the former may not go against the latter due to the latter having direct 
force and validity (thusly primacy); and so we get what is a somewhat altered metaphor of the 
solar and planetary system. In this tailor-made metaphor we have a centrifugal aspect that is 
merely a reaction to the (f)act of having joined the process of European integration, that is, we 
see a process of divergence based on the fact that even though having to give up certain 
blocks  of  sovereignty  is  a  well-known  prerequisite  of  joining  the  European  Union, 
nevertheless, the national interest now within the European framework is making attempts at a 
sort of optimal harm-reduction aimed at rendering the effects of partially lost sovereignty 
minimal.  And  in  this  case  the  centripetal  force  is  represented  not  by  the  (canon  law  of) 
“Roman” tradition of the club of Christian nobility or any other common ideology, rather it is 
exerted by the uninterrupted flow of texts composed in the row of working languages and 
background cultures. 
It is exactly due to this divisionalisation of sovereignty—as this sort of structuring is 
derived from a constitutional level, since its source is the treaty (treaties) establishing the 
Union—why  the  theoretical  possibility  of  discrepancy  is  natively  present  in  even  the 
conceptualisation of this solution. It is rather rare that we see overt attempts at finding out just 
exactly how far the boundaries of discrepancy lay, how much farther the walls can be pushed 
outwards, and neither is it common that we see a player pronouncedly rejecting these—this 
being against the rules. But covertly the governments and judiciaries of member states do this 
all  the  time,  in  a  way  finding  an  outlet  for  their  need  to  experience  their  national 
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independence. This  is  primarily so,  because their constitutions  define these truly national 
institutions  as  genuine  national  agencies—a  definition  connected  to  the  relation  of  the 
executive and the judiciary being of a subordinate nature to the legislative. Their legal status 
as well as the body of law to be applied by them is provided from the single source of the 
legislation working within the framework of statehood. Consequently, they have a centuries-
old intimate relationship with their own national law, since this is their natural habitat. And 
since their professional activity is subordinated to the legislative body of their own homeland, 
even such a scenario is possible where, in  a borderline situation, his  or her own case is 
actually rooting, so to speak, in opposition to his or her own law. 
Yet they receive the body of European Union law as (well, let us say) a mere extra task, a 
sort of chore, which merely multiplies what is an already ample body of domestic sources of 
law.  So  they  usually  treat  these  similarly  to  how  an  English  judge  would  treat  statutory 
instruments when simply following their own tradition: with distrust, as a sort of hampering, 
almost an illegitimate meddling that should best be avoided. And if this external intrusion is 
unavoidable, then the judge shall respect it only to the extent that he or she absolutely has to. 
So to summarise: although law-making and law-application in their polarised dichotomy 
manifest as an external obligation for the judge, still he or she treats and respects the domestic 
law as his or her own, because it is in fact his or hers. This is in contrast to the European law, 
which the judge only experiences as something arriving on his or her bench in a whimsical 
fashion from distant outside powers beyond his or her reach, and coming in forceful and 
unpredictable waves, with blatant disregard for their own level of integrability. While a judge 
is  continuously  contributing to  the building of  the body of law formulated by his  or her 
legislator, because the judge feels that he or she is in fact part of the process of dogmatic 
refinement, rejuvenation based on actualisation, with the European law the judge is not very 
much  exuberant  about  the  possibility  of  contributing  to  progress—among  other  reasons, 
because his or her chance to contribute is at best limited, perhaps even practically nonexistent. 
Therefore  his  or  her  perspective  remains  that  of  the  domestic  law—regardless  of  what 
happens to be the premier background of his or her particular procedure. 
In any case, the model of the legal order of the European Union has, so to speak, spread 
the  process  of  “law-provision”  over  different  tiers—with  almost  as  much  conscious 
determination as Hans Kelsen once had, when in 1922 he revised his original stand from 
before WWI on law-application and imputation/ascription as a mere consequence calculation 
and  validation,  by  declaring  that  for  the  Rechtserzeugungsprozess  [the  process  of  the 
establishment  of  law]  to  actually  occur,  there  are  at  least  two  stages  needed,  since  the 27 
actualised  (i.e.,  case  specific)  application  of  the  future-bound—and  therefore  general-
abstract—posited can only take place in the context of the given specific.
68 
 
2. Order Out of Chaos 
Until the 20
th century practitioners of our social sciences (including our legal science) could 
hardly imagine that law or any somewhat objectified normativity could in fact be effective 
without  a  positivism  that  treated  its  subject  with  clear  definition  existing  behind  it—so 
without support being provided by such an assumption of an operational order being present, 
which would be able to provide the state judiciary, the professional discipline, the teaching 
church (etc.) with grounds allowing it to clearly translate into the language of practice—and 
enforce with its sanctioning mechanisms that which is posited by the given normative order. It 
presented its operation as being mechanised in its ideology: sort of a truly ausdifferenziert 
homogeneity (following Niklas Luhmann’s terminology of Ausdifferenzierung), thus lifting 
the  procedures  performed  in  the  name  of  the  above-mentioned  entities  above  general 
everyday  heterogeneity.  So  what  did  it  do  then?  It  lifted  a  conceptual  order  above  the 
everyday, it has rendered itself reified, and in a somewhat alienated form it (relying on secret 
knowledge incomprehensible and enigmatic for the everyday person) promoted into the status 
of brutally unquestionable consistency and necessity that which appeared, with good reason, 
to  the  excluded  layperson  to  be  not  only  without  convincing  power,  but  also  even  an 
indecipherable and randomly cruel twist of fate.
69 In short: it chased chaos away in order to 
see order in its place. Because chaos and order are in this approach antinomies, and when 
faced with them, we either pick the one or the other. 
It was with the arrival of 20
th century sociology that we see the reformulation of the 
descriptive vision of society. The previous understanding of society as the conglomerate of 
man-made reified structures in self-propelled motion was replaced by a model that was not 
based on a one-way mechanicalness (as is the case with the definition above), rather, it was 
focusing on the spontaneous motion of concurring simultaneities, and on the continuously 
occurring social practice within them, on the statistical result of the motivational-battles of 
individuals, on interactions occurring in actuality. And surprisingly—although its descriptions 
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of the micro were recording nothing but chaos (a continuous floating and state of in-between 
within the perpetuity of attractive and repulsive forces)—still, thanks to the development that 
in all of this it was, nevertheless, always and determinately searching exclusively for signs of 
order  being  created  (including  the  details  of  how,  along  what  avenues,  principles, 
perspectives, and with what chance of success), in its descriptions of the macro it could arrive 
at  the logical  conclusion of the potential for and fact  of  order out  of chaos, that is, one 
originating from, borne out and derived from chaos. 
And it is important to note here that the theoretical notion of macro-order originating and 
eventually  manifesting  from  micro-chaos  is  what  laid  the  foundation  of  the  general 
perspective of modern economics; modern sociology is also rooted in this perspective; and 
this is the theorematic fundament eventually settled on by the deconstructionist aspect of 
today’s jurisprudence, and this latter—incidentally—is a branch of scholarship with much 
older theoretical foundations and developmental span than the former ones.
70 
Today’s social analysts call our attention to the fact that according to the “normativist 
model” of the early 20
th century—from Émile Durkheim to Talcott Parsons—“society after 
society was depicted primarily in terms of the consistency, regularity, and continuity of its 
system of rules and of the power of these rules to bring about behavioral conformity”.
71 It was 
only later that the recognition has been formulated according to which “The essence of human 
life did not lie in following rules and in being rewarded by one’s virtue but in making the best 
use of rules for one’s own self-interest, depending on the situation”. From this time on, social 
theories  are  changed  in  that  “rules  are  seen  as  ambiguous,  flexible,  contradictory,  and 
inconsistent; [...] they serve as resources for human strategies, strategies that vary from person 
to person and from situation to situation... Order is never complete and never can be”.
72 
Well, this has the realisation serving as its foundation deeply rooted in social theory, 
according to  which we  have absolutely no criteria available to  us  for  providing proof of 
“differentiating  at  an  ontological  level”  among  the  various  branches  of  social  sciences. 
Jurisprudence too is comfortably floating on being propelled by its concept of normativity 
(the force of normative enactments, and so on), while it has absolutely no social scientific 
affirmation that it could point to for support.
73 And this may result in cynical, apparently 
relativising attitudes—with the dry constatation, for instance, that “the making of rules and 
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social  and  symbolic  order  is  a  human  industry  matched  only  by  the  manipulation, 
circumvention, remaking, replacing and unmaking of rules and symbols in which people seem 
almost  equally  engaged”
74—,  unless  we  are  cognisant  of  the  fact  that  this  description 
originates from the classic author of cultural anthropology: relying on a diagnosis of standard 
human behaviour exactly so that she could somehow be enabled to demonstrate the nature of 
the eventual order rising out of the chaotic nature thereof. 
Well, it is as if early on the deconstructionism of legal science seemed to have dethroned 
the professional tenet of legal positivism, voiding it with critique that was exposing it for what 
it was and irreversibly (destructively) overwriting it. In the long run, however, this seems to 
have  produced  the  result  of  the  previous  static  vision  of  order—whereby  everything  is 
rendered reified with mechanical simplicity—being replaced by the potential for order being 
described as a process, through / understood as / traced back to the attribute of the ceaseless 
dynamism of fluctuating motion. In terms of the methodology of fermenting this train of 
thought, it was perhaps Ludwig Wittgenstein, then on the one hand, the speech-act theory (as 
the consequence of the auto-transubstantiation of the positivist philosophy of science), and on 
the other hand, the cognitive sciences that played the most decisive role in contributing. As a 
new systemic concept this could then become the point of departure for imagining a self-
organised entity that would be constructed through autopoiesis—that is, through a process 
whereby the systemic end-result features solid and confident self-identity, despite its internal 
governing principles having been formed along the way through a variable and protracted 
process.  It  was  the  English–American  movement  of  Critical  Legal  Studies
75—which, 
functioning perhaps as an agent provocateur, was questioning the underlying ideology and 
offering new methodology at the same time—that reshaped the landscape most effectively 
and to the most radical extent, yet the final conclusions were drawn (concurrently, and in 
terms of partial result perhaps even ahead of it) by a new legal ontology.
76 
The reason for this was that the latter could raise the level of discourse onto a higher 
level in terms of social scientific significance, as it managed to place both  the external 
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ideological criticism (which, based on an epistemological approach, was attacking from a 
counter-position  and  aiming  at  revealing  hidden  weaknesses)  and  the  criticism  of  the 
methodology  applied  by  lawyers  when  establishing  their  visions  of  the  world  inside  the 
process-description of the actual operation of law, thusly it could analyse the components 
discovered  therein  as  true  ontological  entities.  Since  it  characterised  the  overall  social 
complex as it exists at any given time as it is measured by the status  of self-affirmative 
exertion (at any given time) manifesting in the interaction of partial-complexes of natively 
relative autonomy that eventually form some sort of final (tendential) unity resting on an 
identifiable trend. And hidden inside of this we have—even as far as the operation of law is 
concerned—what  is  an  obligatory  prerequisite  for  today’s  economy-centred  mainstream 
materialism: the conflict of interests embedded in the collision of different manifestations of 
legal  formalism,  and in  those scenarios where  abstract  positive legal  rules are applied in 
specific cases conjuring discrepancies in practical implementation. Nonetheless, it is exactly 
the legally constructed formulation of conflict-resolution and conflict-settlement within the 
legal professional methodology’s process-reconstructions that fill the gap between—on the 
one  hand—the  lack  of  a  truly  unbroken  chain  of  logic,  and—on  the  other  hand—the 
specifically  unique  nature  of  an  adjudication  situation  (in  which  the  adjudicator  fills  an 
irrevocably personal role of a constitutive character with an irrevocable and non-transferable 
personal responsibility attached to adjudicator’s participation). 
In  all  of  this  we  can  find  the  explanation  (in  terms  of  the  legal  organisation  of  the 
European Union) for which we have introduced the bipolar structure comprised of—on the 
one hand—the production and releasing of law by the European Union as a supranational 
entity and—on the other hand—the reception and conversion thereof by the member states, 
moreover—and  thirdly—the  simultaneity  of  randomly  colourful  motion  propelled  by 
centripetal and centrifugal forces, which nonetheless has the net result of creating order with 
its overall cohesive critical mass. So which of these forces is of a creative nature in this 
precariously balanced and balancing structure? Well, according to the above, these are, on the 
one hand, the explicit legislative activity of the whole of the representative institutions of the 
European  Union,  and  that  of  its  agencies  empowered  to  produce  and  put  law  into  force 
(manifesting in the power to enter treaties, release directives, and produce court rulings), as 
well  as  its  tacit  legislation  (which  demands  recognition  under  the  aegis  of  acquis 
communautaire), and, on the other hand, the reception given to all of these by the member 
states at their organisational-institutional levels (e.g., how they carry their validity into further 
spheres, how they adapt and implement them). And the final product of all of this is no other 31 
than something nobody has attempted to describe thus far, although this could be a sort of a 
The State of the Law of the European Union similar to what is recurring practice of the State 
of the Union in the United States.
77 
As  we  know  from  George  Luk￡cs’  gigantic  socio-ontological  undertaking,
78  man’s 
conscious identifications of aims always tend to get realised differently from the original 
target, as they end up being either relatively more or less, or they may simply get realised as 
something entirely different. And as we know also from him: this is not merely a sign of 
divergency, a margin for error, a human failure, a lack of a valiant effort, or perhaps that of 
futility, rather a fundamental fact of socio-ontology, and as such, it is the starting point of any 
praxis-philosophy understood as a system of social theory capable of providing/venturing to 
seek  an  actual  description  of  practice.  So  the  order  that—in  concreto—happens  to  be 
produced out of all of this, is exactly whatever could possibly evolve at all as the result of the 
free-flowing  and  fixed  forces  active  in  the  system.  Observing  it  at  any  given  time,  its 
corresponding state is then such a characteristic, in the framework, on the ground, and from 
the origin of which—exactly as just-so-being [Gerade-so-Sein] in the exclusive ontological 
actuality—all subsequent movements are taking place. 
It  is  strange  for  us  to  recall  today  about  Friedrich  Engels—who  attempted  to  apply 
Hegel’s methodological notions to the philosophy of science of his times—just how much his 
multifaceted  concept  of  dialectics  (which,  despite  its  dogmas  and  certain  erroneous 
components, included at least the potential for some sense of openness in terms of prospect) 
rigidified, and subsequently became the scene of brutally irrefutable and inexorable (perhaps 
best  described  as  automatically  predestined)  social  processes  in  the  Soviet  version  of 
Marxism, as a materialistic theology of a kind of order, which possesses such a sense of 
superiority, perfection, and completeness (derived from having been successfully finalised), 
which is equal in measure exactly to the degree it is free of contradiction at any given time.
79 
It also brings a smile to our face when we recall that it could have actually been the 
dilettantism of the Chinese Socialist dictator, Mao Tse-Tung,
80 when it came to his dabbling 
in philosophy (which incidentally also relied on elements of Eastern wisdom), that may have 
opened the eyes of the then already Sovietised Central and Eastern European region to the 
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notion that to rebut, that is, contradiction, is no antonym of order. It  is not anarchy, not 
rebellion, not counterrevolution; thusly it is neither a matter of state security once recalled. 
Because it is in fact not a sign of rejection (through statements), rather it is a natural sign of 
life, and as such is the true lifestyle of any organism that is in fact actually functioning; or to 
use Lukács-speak once again: it is the phenomenal form of the quality that anything that can 
operate is performing its operation along the aforementioned line, this being a fundamental 
fact  of  existence,  opposite  to  which  there  can  be  nothing  but  the  denial  of  life  (i.e., 
motionlessness or death). 
So  tension,  conflict,  or  the  fact  that  resolutions  of  issues  are  reached  via  difficult 
processes at any given time are not signs of dysfunction, rather these are the functionality of 
any truly operational system. No manifestation of a lack of order, rather it is exactly the 
unavoidable  prerequisite  for  and  the  way  of  the  reconstruction/reaffirmation  of  order 
(theoretically always at a higher level), which is a naturally occurring and necessary process 
from time-to-time, as order has to be able to provide answers to the challenges facing it and 
has to withstand when practical (compromise) solutions are reached at any given time, with 
storms of expectations as well. 
 
3. Continuum in Flux 
It is this kind of kinetic-dynamism into which we have integrated the structuring solution for 
the problem that a serious portion of the European Union’s legal manifestations are of a soft, 
rather  than  a  hard  nature,  that  is,  this  law  can  hardly  be  interpreted  within  the  static 
framework of formalism containing such plain polarities as obligatory / not obligatory, can be 
applied / cannot be applied, or valid / not valid. So all of this presents us a flexible image (i.e., 
a kind actually not binding through its formal character) of law (allowing for ever-changing 
conclusions being drawn from case to case, based on the various interpretations of cases and 
standards dependent on context or the criterion of what is purposeful), which is an exact 
denial of both the classic legal positivism characteristic of our Continental yesteryears as well 
as that of our Socialist European yesterday,
81 since it overwrites the possibility of imagining a 
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law of “a purely domestic character”.
82 Because what it offers instead is merely continuum.
83 
This is that we can discover today through ontological reconstruction as a final truth behind 
the  formalism  and  the  disciplinary  restrictions  of  the  kinetic  processes  of  law.
84  Our 
supplementary factor here is, however, that those classic form-structures that have been relied 
on by the individual nations have by now mostly been weakened by having been integrated  
into the legal order of the European Union; and the professional deontology implied as its 
own recommends a kind of concentration (which is deconstructive in the formal sense, as it is 
destroying even the remaining legal homogeneity) on expressly substant ial (i.e., one merely 
referred by the legal normative expression, but not contained therein, thus heterogeneous) 
contents. 
In addition to the continuous presence of and reliance on the  teleological,  the  other 
element that has also been serving as the foundation of this was the juridical formulation of 
the doctrine of “direct application”
85 and “indirect effect”
86 as early as a quarter of a century 
ago.  However,  characteristically  of  the  professionally  formulated  obscure  speech  of  the 
European Union, this burst into the legal order thereof in such a way, that it, on the one hand, 
has left it unclear to this day exactly what, when, and under what circumstances (i.e., in the 
presence of what fulfilled conditions) can the centrally posited overwrite that by the national 
legislation; and, on the other hand, it continued to maintain the national legal orders on the 
polar  opposite  side,  while  leaving  the  task  to  the  national  side  to  adapt  or  exchange  the 
nationally posited for anything originating from the community;  a process that has thusly 
continued  to  be  based  on  domestic  application,  that  is,  on  the  discretion  of  local 
contemplation and interpretation. Since no other conclusion could indeed be drawn than the 
one according to which 
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that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of that state or the principles of 
a national constitutional structure.” C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (1970) ECR 1125, 3. 
86 C-14/83 Von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (1984) ECR I-1891. 34 
“the Member States’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by the directive and their 
duty under Article 5 of the Treaty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the 
fulfilment of that obligation, is binding on all the authorities of Member States including, for matters within their 
jurisdiction,  the  Courts.  It  follows  that,  in  applying  national  law,  whether  the  provisions  in  question  were 
adopted before or after the directive, the national Court called upon to interpret it is required to do so, as far as 
possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the 
latter.”
87 
It is easy for us to see that it was the entire legal perspective of the European Union which 
was turned into a pragmatic-instrumentality instead of the primacy of any legal dogmatism in 
this way, being true to its ever more openly acknowledged mobilising function, rather than 
being true to its regulatory function in the classic narrow sense.
88 
It is well known that in the large structure itself, which is being built during the process 
of operation, beyond the directives influencing only certain limited areas, it is undoubtedly 
the  court  rulings  (which  also  take  on  the  task  of  securing  the  entire   legal  order  and 
constitutionality) that set the milestones; with a huge number of consequential results that 
often set even the vision of the role of the community courts on new paths, and these results 
can occasionally be more dramatic than even the founding treaties concluded with the utmost 
formality. Consequentially in this process, as a result of the liberating effect of these factors, 
the authors of the European law continue down the slippery slope and tend to keep upping the 
ante by proposing ever-bolder ideas, thereby further eroding this  formlessness. They draw 
legal  conclusion  from  trends  and  facts  of  institutional  developments,  while  the  only 
framework provided for any of this kind of activity (regarding the role of the judiciary, the 
alleged  dissolution  of  any  formal-doctrinal  discipline,  the  ultimate  ideal  of  the  pragmatic 
ambition  capable  of  penetrating  just  about  anything)  is  the  overgeneralisation  of  other 
authors. Moreover, it is as if nobody was bothered by the fact that (whether it be a community 
act, or the generalisations of a free-floating intellect that we are talking about) even the bare 
minimum of what was regarded as a sine qua non even in the Socialist doctrine is absent: 
laying the foundation of whatever is the target of their eventual intervention with first doing 
preparatory  work,  case-studies  and  debates  on  cost/benefit  analysis,  and  with  the 
identification and affixing of the actual cornerstones.
89 Yet they keep skipping these steps, 
since we can only find a limited number of pointers about the underlying basic issue whether 
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a precedent-type law is in fact alive or is in the process of development inside the womb of 
the European Union (and if so, then which type and sui generis version of it); these pointers 
being certain judicial decisions of unclear status themselves, which are not overtly identified 
as possessing the quality of precedent, and where this quality is only identified a personal 
interpretation of the author, based on self-referential clues, or on consequences drawn from 
other clues. But if all that intuitive reconstruction can decipher out of any such signal is that—
along certain fundamental material values and procedural principles, and with the insertion of 
certain forums—it is the efficiency of reaching target that is of premier importance, then we 
have indeed returned to reliving
90 the excitement-filled historical time of the “revolutionary 
honeymoon period”.
91 Since this means that the state of things is such that the main area of 
action  is  the  mobilisation  for  self-propelled  social  activity  and  the  encouragement  of 
autocatalytic processes (akin to grass-roots initiatives), in an atmosphere where each player is 
stopping  the  building  of  new  boundaries  at  their  own  doorstep;  a  building  process  that, 
incidentally, is continuously breaking down the previously demarcated ones. 
Consequently,  these  kinds  of  complex  movements,  including  divergent  motions, 
discernible in the legal reality of the European Union, simply represent a certain state, that of 
being alive, and, moreover, as a necessary actualised form and consequence of its consciously 
designed  multipolarity.  Naturally,  from  an  analytical  perspective,  ultimately  it  is  not  the 
presence  of  these  factors  that  is  of  interest,  rather  it  is  the  longitudinal  tracking  and 
observation of whether or not the totality of these motions exhibits the character of a singular 
trend  when  evaluated  at  the  end  of  their  respective  time  period,  and  if  such  uniform 
(tendential) trend is in fact identifiable, then what is the nature thereof. In other words, how 
does  the  end  result  likely  to  manifest  measure  up  against  the  one  that  had  been  ideally 
expected at the outset; is there a need for intervention to correct the course, that is, is it called 
for that the future course of these be reset with the tools at hand, and if so, then, in what 
direction. 
It also follows from the above that it can only be considered wishful and rather simplified 
ideological thinking (bordering on the Utopian), based on which the statement could be made 
that, based on what is undoubtedly a level of integration getting higher by the day, both the 
European Union and its law shall eventually reach a uniform or unified state, so to speak. 
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Because  this  would  not  result  in  the  coming  of  some  End  of  History
92—so  that  an 
eschatological synthesis could then bless our everyday reality—, since never in history have 
we actually witnessed, as a socio-ontological reality, humankind reaching a final state of rest 
longed for in the form of a transcendental final arrival. So whatever is taking place now is 
actually not a process eventually terminating in a final uniformity, not convergence, not a 
final resolution, and neither is it an ultimate coming together of all the contributors in  a 
projected future Golden Age at the end of a single path. Instead, we should likely say that in 
the current structure of the European Union the discrete parts (existing at any given time) 
preserve their state of standing apart while and via being diverging components of partial 
units  constantly  restated/reaffirmed  at  ever  higher  levels.  Accordingly,  the  discrepancies 
necessarily regenerated at any given time are not so much contradictions based on the denial 
of something, rather they are variations forming with a relative independence on top of a 
principal thesis that is merely implicitly expressed (because these variations—just as in the 
repetitious fugal structure—express the main theme in their fragmentary quality). 
 
4. Locally Activated 
However, at the same time, several further consequences result from the recognition of the 
above.  Since  in  this  sort  of  complex  kinetic  scenario  only  what  gets  actually  realised  in 
practice is effectuated and enforced. 
Yet, it is important for us to see here that whatever we identified as bipolarity in the way 
the  European  Union’s  legal  system  is  structured,  carries  relevance  exclusively  from  the 
perspective of legal imputation/ascription, referencing, and (validity-)enforcing; but it has no 
real existence in terms of the sociological, and neither does it have an independent existence 
discernible from a disciplinal perspective of the theory of power/officialdom. Since just as in 
the League of Nations or in the United Nations, it is the aggregate of the constitutive member 
states that is the actor in acting in the name and through the institutional system of the given 
international entity (showing that multiplicity had by then been transformed into a common 
will), this has been observed as happening the same way in the history of the evolution of the 
European community thus far. While whatever is produced as European law in the regulatory 
or adjudicatory institutions of Brussels, Strasbourg or Luxembourg provides the foundation 
for a legally independent source of validity, one that, nevertheless, has no existence without 
the constitutive states. Not only because (legally) there would be no entity on the receiving 
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end,  but  also  because  whatever  even  actually  does  appear  as  European  law  could  not 
(sociologically)  be  forged  without  them.  It  is  merely  as  consequence  of  the  series  of  its 
establishing treaties that we can even talk about the existence of the European Union, of its 
institutional system, of citizenship expressing inclusion therein, and of anything else. While 
the operative character of the nation state is a sociological reality, the European communal 
conglomeration of national operations is just a legal derivation and reference, a normatively 
treated conceptual web, in which the only additional reality is represented by the presence of 
conformity  (the  bare  fact  that  conduct  is  in  functional  correlation  with  the  posited),  and 
behind it, it is the ideology of being European that represents an additional psyche, which can 
be described as prevailing (since it lands itself to being described as operational). While the 
Union’s administration, its activity as a unit is just the treaty-based projection of a given 
grouping of national entities, however, lacking anything that was not already present in the 
composing national frameworks. We have all contributed to the construction of its buildings, 
it was us who recruited its functionaries, we continue to provide its funding. It, thusly, has 
nothing  beyond  what  is  ours.  Its  projections  too  are  just  whatever  we  ourselves  have 
transferred to it via empowerment provided by our association. So it is the wholeness as a 
relative total manifested in them, each and every consent and fulfilled desire, in a peculiar 
transformed state, once the compromises reached as a result of cooperation allow it. And this 
is so even if, as result of the neophyte attraction of our time we can now locate a growing 
number of individuals in Brussels, in Strasbourg or in Luxembourg, as well as in international 
law  offices  who—due  to  having  been  artificially  programmed  or  because  of  a  personal 
conviction—are  loyal  or  attached  to  no  nation,  but  to  the  entity  that  generates  they 
themselves:  the  European  Union.  Their  individual-psyche,  however,  is  no  ontological 
category  until  such  a  functioning  psyche  does  not  manifest  as  a  force  exerting  palpable 
influence on our social existence, that is, until it does not appear as an independent social 
factor. 
However,  the  ontological  significance  and  practical  exclusivity  of  the  member  state 
status grants a practically exclusive significance to the only possible forms, intensity and 
effectiveness  of  national  participatio,  that  is,  the  optimality  measured  against  the  given 
nation’s wiggle room in the framework of all players. 
Consequently, all nations have to plan their path with conscious preparatory groundwork, 
including  the  forms  and  methods  they  wish  to  rely  on  when  attempting  to  influence 
community life, while taking into account all that has already transpired in terms of strategies 
and tactics applied successfully/unsuccessfully within the dynamics of the total structure, and 38 
also regarding theoretical and procedural methods, value and interest related trends, and ways 
of  national  adaptation  and  implementation;  doing  all  this  by  way  of  conducting  prudent 
comparative studies (applying criteria such as whether or not the particular instance under 
scrutiny  was  a  singular  or  historically  proven  solution,  while  also  paying  attention  to 
identifying what are and are not the established notions of nationhood and tradition in the 
European sphere of argumentation). Naturally, as a feature of national participation, member 
states  represent  themselves  in  the  European  Union  based  in  part  on  their  successive 
governments, and in part by their representation in the European Parliament, the nature of 
which in any given term is also determined, although indirectly, by the political makeup of 
their national legislative body. And regardless of how deep the domestic political divisions 
may be in this respect, these two national sides obviously must—using a term borrowed from 
the social ontology of George Lukács once again—manifest in a tendential (as in governed by 
a common trend) unity, otherwise it is inevitable that the common national interest will suffer 
as result of their pugnacious and narrow-minded approach missing the big picture. 
And this sheds a particularly important light on the phenomenon we tend to refer to as 
phase-lag in our own Central and Eastern European legal universe as an inherited piece of 
reality surviving from the Socialist political system, which we have been forced to endure. In 
particular, this means that since WWII we have not been able to get to know directly, and 
consequently  have  not  been  able  to  familiarise  ourselves  with,  and  master  the  connected 
practical skills  related to, certain  significant developments  that have occurred in  Western 
European  and  Atlantic  law,  as  well  as  in  the  legal  implementation  of  natively  (directly) 
societal  considerations—such  as  the  use  of  referring  to  natural  law  by  taking  into 
consideration “the nature of things”; the argumentation and persuasion resting on principles 
and stipulated clauses; the speech in terms of human rights and with the constitutionalisation 
of issues; and the open contest of values that are to be safeguarded (based on weighing the 
one against the other)—similarly to how have been left out of the changes that have occurred 
in terms of how the juridical function has evolved from being a mere dispenser of official 
pronouncements to being the venue and tool of resolving multiplayer societal problems.
93 
And the inexorable conclusion arising from this is that from the trichotomous typology of 
premodern and modern followed by postmodern outlined earlier, the potential carried by the 
latter,  i.e.,  the  postmodernism’s  instrumentality,  has  essentially  remained  unused  in  the 
juridical  practice  of  formerly  Socialist  Central  and  Eastern  European  member  states. 
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Consequently, our room for play has been limited to however much is afforded by modernity, 
which obviously results in our relative uncompetitiveness, which is a sort of innate handicap 
on the common European legal marketplace. So until such time that we will have reached a 
state of complete equality of methodology, we shall continue to be the cause of the limited 
nature of our own effectiveness and curtail the protection of our national interest, or we can be 
the (indirect) cause of these efforts being limited (or perhaps even practically defeated) by 
exterior forces. 
 
VI. European Law Practiced 
1. Ethos 
If,  and  to  the  extent,  our  strategy  followed  so  far  has  been  determined  by  unconditional 
integration—as  if  the  lack  of  such  total  integration  would  prevent  us  from  enjoying  the 
desired benefits  of our  new member state status—then (after the initial  years of “junior” 
membership spent rehearsing our new role) we will inevitably have to supplement this view 
and bring it to a more sophisticated state, and then we have to organically reintegrate it into 
this new totality, by way of doing prudent work in particularly significant areas, such as the 
channels, procedures, methods and routines of protecting national interests. Above all, we 
would be well advised to get proficient at the new culture of sensibility, the command of 
which frees  us  from  the tie of what  is  otherwise an unavoidable necessity of the legally 
consequential, and whereby, instead of a straight subordination, we could also engage in a 
practical dialogue therewith, and thusly maximise its potential advantages, and, at the same 
time, minimise certain of its aspects that may hic et nunc appear disadvantageous for us, or in 
the  best  case  scenario,  whereby  we  could  turn  it  into  the  source  of  newly  discovered 
advantages (using it as a sort of anabasis, as in didactic historical stories
94). 
Because behind all that, in general, we find the internal intellectual struggle of the  
European legal thinking of our time —namely, for example: the dilemma, significance and 
stake, and even the sheer likelihood of convergence of the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon 
approach to legal regulation; the interrelation of the national-domestic and the intra-European 
international; the details of (voluntary and involuntary forms of) legal harmonisation and the 
chance  for  common  codification;  the  contest  of  the  various  national  heritages  and  their 
respective fixed “styles” both in common juridical work and in the creation of a new legal 
tradition; and also the way in which a par excellence independent and genuinely European 
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legal  scholarship  can  develop;  and  finally,  based  on  which  the  designing  of  the  internal 
structure  and  the  generation  of  the  substance  of  a  European  legal  education  has  been 
occurring (along the line of the equivalency criteria)
95—manifested in an (internal) contest, 
which  (although  occurring  hidden  in  the  shadow  of  the  abstract  regime  of  academic 
jurisprudence) is, in a final evaluation, a field of competitive struggle. Yet, we would be well-
advised to be cognisant of the fact that, even on the marketplace of doctrines, it is not merely 
the  ideas  themselves  that  are  on  offer;  the  issue  of  whether  or  not  they  are  destined  to 
eventually become widely recognised and accepted as consensual concepts is dependent on 
their  overall  depth  (sophistication  of  their  background),  which  is  obviously  a  feature  of 
exclusive privilege, afforded only to those national entities that have larger and more robust 
scientific institutions, and also, behind this, on the power of the familiar, the habitual, and also 
that of (special) interest covertly/indirectly reinforcing these longitudinal constants almost 
unnoticeably generating a sensation of comfort, as the foundational discussions themselves 
are also “for the most part, firmly based in national and local contexts”.
96 
 
2. Own Efforts 
Because, as we could see, the European colossus currently referred to as the Union is being 
building in the hope of putting the enormous energy potential of our continent to use, in what 
appears to be an unprecedentedly liberated new European intellectual sphere, which has been 
ridded, so to speak, of historical and national restrictions. So the key players continue to be 
the still fallible historical particularities, since it is not spiritual ideals leading the way, rather 
we are still guided by the same old familiar actors, namely statehoods which have previously 
ended up fighting (by choice) or having to fight (due to the external will of other forces) many 
wars in the name of protecting their individual interests during their millennia of common 
history. Consequently, their separate interests even now continue to be identified in their own 
self,  regardless  of  the  fact  that  now  these  happen  to  be  wrapped  (sublimated)  in  the 
encapsulation format designated by the community life identified as the “European Union”. 
What  used  to  be  a  bloody  conventional  physical  battle  fought  with  arms  has  by  now 
reached—at  least  in  its  appearances,  on  the  surface—the  more  (post)modern,  currently 
acceptable form of democratic participation, while the whole dynamics have, not surprisingly, 
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remained unchanged, and it is still a battle of interests that is the immediate context of this 
reality. 
These  interests  are  largely  national.  Yet  now  these  can  be  neutralised,  altered,  or 
rebalanced/reconstituted by local and regional (including cross-border regional, in the case 
neighbouring  states)  interests,  which,  from  time  to  time,  are  even  capable  of 
circumventing/substituting/overtaking that which would otherwise not have appropriate form 
if attempted to be formulated from (within) the regular framework of nationhood. Beyond the 
tipping point, these traditionally structured interests (characterised as partial, fragmented, or 
particular) can easily find themselves on the polar opposite of the critical mass of these newly 
constituted  gravitational  centres;  and  these  characteristically  global-economic  trends  of 
cosmopolitan pervasion focused on global empire-building aspirations and the amassing of 
wealth,  which  by  now  have  occupied  a  position  antithetical  to  the  once  Westphalian 
achievement, and propose a future for Europe that is going to surpass the notion of nation-
statehood (as a way of existence defined as the one distinguished from the inter-nationalist 
way)—doing all this under the pretext of advancing integration, but also (and in reality) under 
the spell  of a bureaucratic (decision-making) powerhouse of  a superpower,  envisioning  a 
comfortably conducive environment for the effective control of preferred market positions; 
doing all of this on a heap of rubble that had in its previous state been the democratic ideal 
(now rendered the democratic deficit), and the social concern that had once upon a time also 
been a basic promise, and as such, potential of the envisaged Europe. 
Legal cultures are standing side-by-side in this complex. In legal terms, nation by nation 
they are all—individually—equal as member states, yet their chance of survival (i.e., their 
potential for either gaining further strength or losing significance altogether) in a historical 
sense,  is  measured  by  their  ability  to  exert  influence  based  on  their  innovating  power.
97 
Whatever academic pathos surrounds the guesswork involved in attempting to size up the 
chance  of  European  continental  Civil  Law  and  Anglo -Saxon  Common  Law  traditions 
eventually fusing or continuing to exist side-by-side, the prospect of convergence, obviously, 
shall not be determined by its internal factors, rather it will be the net result of the individual 
abilities for survival, the outcome of the battle of competing intellects pitched against each 
other. The preparatory work of the harmonisation and codification of European common law 
is registered by its cultivators everywhere as academic research, in abstract vehicles, under the 
aegis of the principle of the universality-concept of science; while and at the same time we 
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must also recognise that these processes occur in reality as vehicles of the direct application 
of legal methodologies, skills and usages, and value systems native to national background 
cultures, that is, as inherent part of, or serving the cause of, national expansion. Finally, the 
particular nation states are not merely recipients and ultimate interpreters of the central case-
law  produced  as  the  output  of  European  juridical  work,  but  additionally—through  their 
strategic and tactical choices applied to their official commentaries and preliminary questions 
and  inquiries  submitted—they  themselves  can  potentially  become  participants  in,  or  even 
movers  of  the  processes  and  thusly  the  constituent  determinants  of,  the  future  of  the 
community. 
This is because the Union’s Europe is about dynamism. For almost at least two decades 
we have been witnessing what is apparently the relentless seething of a laboratorie vivant fed 
by a certain jacobinisme activism.
98 In this process we have the decisive for ce of the raison 
économique  driving  integration,  which  is  supplemented,  as  raison  symbolique,  by  other 
features  as  well,  which  are  all  derived  and  adopted  from  the  spirit  of  the  times,  as,  for 
example, the case may  be with  human rights  in our situation, which in  this  scenario are 
serving as the background for the body of rules governing free trade and the free movement of 
goods,  that  is,  features  that  function  as  props  on  the  stage  arranged  according  to  the 
requirements of postmodern democracy.
99 And let us  not miss the point that both of these 
legal tiers directly effect our future: they hold the key to what is the true meaning of our 
membership  in  the  European  Union,  thusly  they  have  a  lot  to  do  with  the  chain  of 
consequences  defining  the  framework  of  our  l ife.  For—as  termed  by  one  of  the  past 
presidents of the European Court—„Qui participe à la Communauté épouse son droit.”
100 
So the final outcome of our analysis is that there is no natively European law. So far we 
have member state nations, and currently it is only their cyclically renewed consensus (which 
is ideally reached via mutual compromise) that can produce the European law at any time. 
They can do this in a community of nations in which each and every participant is nominally 
equal. Yet in practice, however, their particular size, economic wealth, and, last but not least, 
their level of sophistication in terms of being cultured (well versed, fluent) in the ways of 
Europe renders (promotes or demotes) them players with differing chances of success amid 
the continuity of challenges and contests. Their skilfulness, endurance, focus, and tactical 
affinity are being tested all the time. There are of course no losers per se, only players whose 
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100 From the speech of President Robert Lecourt (1967 –1976) in celebration of the 20
th year of the Declaration 
by Robert Schuman in Brussels on 5 May 1970. 43 
interests are forced from the fore. Those statehoods and nations behind them are destined for 
such less favourable track, which have proved to be less proactive in terms of keeping even 
their own dynamism alive. Or, it proves to be true and concludable in all its feasible directions 
to claim that “If the »new legal order« is to have reality and full meaning it cannot be simply 
the extension of any one constituent system to a broader field of application.”
101 Instead, what 
we  have  here  is  the  sum  total  of  all  parts,  wherein  only  that  gets  included  which  had 
previously been released into the common stream of the common procedure with appropriate 
care and determination.
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